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I. ExcisE TAX-ENTIRE NET INCOME OF DOMESTIC CORPORATION
ENGAGED IN MULTISTATE OPERATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE
TO TENNESSEE
The Tennessee Supreme Court case of John Ownbey Co. v. Butler'
presents the question whether the entire net income of a domestic
corporation, engaged in multistate operations, is attributable to Ten-
nessee for excise tax purposes. A second question presented is whether
a tax on the entire net income from such multistate operations violates
the commerce clause.
Four domestic corporations contested the excise tax as applied to
their entire net income. The court viewed the case presented by the
Gray & Dudley Company as the best in opposition to the tax; here
only its activities will be discussed. Gray & Dudley, a manufacturer
and seller of appliances, accounted for approximately five per cent of
its annual sales to customers within Tennessee, while approximately
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 211 Tenn. 366, 365 S.W.2d 33 (1963).
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ninety-five per cent of its sales were to customers in other states.
Approximately ninety per cent of the total sales were made through
solicitation of orders of manufacturers' representatives with ship-
ment from Gray & Dudley to the purchaser. This, of course,
necessitated the use of channels of interstate commerce in the case of
out-of-state purchases. Approximately eight per cent of these sales
were made through independent warehouses located in Connecticut,
New York, Louisiana and California. Gray & Dudley shipped this
approximately eight per cent of its goods to such out-of-state ware-
houses where manufacturers' representatives operating within such
states made sales and deliveries direct to the customers. Such out-of-
state purchasers were billed from Gray & Dudley's Tennessee office
and payment was remitted thereto. Gray & Dudley likewise made
about two per cent of its out-of-state sales in Louisiana and New
York through agents of Gray & Dudley located there. This two per
cent of goods was shipped to these agents, who upon receipt stored
the goods in their warehouses. These agents made the sales and
deliveries from their warehouse inventory, received all payments for
such sales, maintained books and records, and submitted a monthly
inventory to Gray & Dudley's Tennessee office, accompanied by
payment for the goods.
All corporations organized for profit under the laws of Tennessee
and doing business in Tennessee are required annually to pay an
excise tax of a certain amount on their net income from business done
within the state.2 Where a corporation does business in Tennessee
and elsewhere the net earnings are apportioned. The net earnings as
thus apportioned to Tennessee are deemed the earnings arising from
business done within the state.
3
For determining the amount of excise tax due on the net income of
.multistate manufacturing business, Tennessee has a three factor
apportionment formula, each of which factors compares Tennessee
value to total value in the categories of (1) tangible property, (2)
manufacturing cost, and (3) sales. 4
From 1943 until 1959 Gray & Dudley was treated by the Tennessee
Tax Commissioner as doing business both within and outside Tennes-
see. Consequently, this taxpayer was permitted to determine the
amount of business attributable to Tennessee for tax purposes by the
use of the manufacturers' apportionment formula. However, begin-
ning with the year 1959, the Commissioner took the position that Gray
& Dudley was engaged in business only in Tennessee; that their entire
net income was attributable to Tennessee for excise tax purposes;
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2701 to -2724 (1956).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2706 (Supp. 1964).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2707 (1956).
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and that Gray & Dudley was not, for tax purposes, doing business
outside Tennessee. As a result, the Commissioner refused to allow
this taxpayer to use the apportionment formula to determine the
amount of income attributable to Tennessee for excise tax purposes
and imposed a tax on the entire net income from Gray & Dudley's
multistate business. The court's opinion states that the Commissioner
came to the conclusion that Gray & Dudley's entire net income was
attributable to Tennessee for tax purposes because Congress had
passed Public Law 86-272, which, the Commissioner thought, pre-
vented any other state from taxing any of the income of Gray &
Dudley. Hence, concluded the Commissioner, if no other state could
tax any of Gray & Dudley's income, Tennessee could then claim that
all of Gray & Dudley's income was earned from business done in
Tennessee.
Public Law 86-2725 denies to the states the power to impose taxes
on or measured by net income derived within the state from inter-
state commerce if the only business activities carried on within the
state are the solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal
property, where the orders are sent outside the state for approval or
rejection and are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside
the state. In short, this legislation gives immunity from taxation only
where there is an out-of-state seller whose only connection with the
taxing state is that of soliciting orders for the sale of tangible personal
property.
The Tennessee Supreme Court sustained the Commissioner and
permitted the State of Tennessee to impose its excise tax on the
entire net income of Gray & Dudley. The court held that for tax
purposes Gray & Dudley was not "doing business" outside Tennessee.
Consequently, this taxpayer was not permitted to use the apportion-
ment formula which is applicable where a corporation is doing busi-'
ness in Tennessee and elsewhere.
What constitutes "business done" in Tennessee within the meaning
of the Tennessee excise tax statute is, of course, a matter to be con-
clusively determined by the Tennessee Supreme Court, within per-
missible constitutional bounds.6 The Ownbey court quoted the 1943
Tennessee case of Memphis Natural Gay Co. v. McCanless7 to the
effect that the 1937 Tennessee legislature intended to include earn-
ings from interstate commerce as far as they could. While that
may be true, nevertheless, it is very doubtful that Public Law
86-272 would immunize Gray & Dudley from taxes on a consider-
5. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (1959).
6. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); General Trading Co.
v State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
7. 180 Tenn. 695, 177 S.W.2d 843 (1943).
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able amount of their income from their activities in states other
than Tennessee. It will be recalled that some ten per cent of Gray
& Dudley's total income was derived from sales through warehouses
in other states. An authority in the field, commenting on the scope
of Public Law 86-272, has said: "Local warehousing and delivery of
goods out of a local warehouse are clearly beyond the pale of
the minimum standards set up for immunity. Instead, shipment must
be made from a point outside the state."8 Moreover, the curb placed
on state taxing power by Public Law 86-272 was not, in any sense,
intended by Congress to increase the taxing power in any state or
create new definitions of "doing business" for tax purposes. This is
made crystal clear by the Senate Report No. 658 of the Committee
of Finance, accompanying the bill subsequently, enacted into Public
Law 86-272: "The Bill does not give to the States any power to tax
income derived from interstate commerce. The power of the States in
this respect will be determined with no inference from the Bill."9
During the floor debate in the Senate, Senator Byrd stressed the fact
that the bill was only a curb on state taxing power and not a grant
of such power: "There is nothing in the bill which authorizes any
taxation by the State. There is a tax immunity provided in the bill
in certain situations, but there is nothing in the bill to give the States
any power to levy a tax on interstate commerce."10
Also, it might be asked whether the fact that other states have
not, or cannot, tax a portion of the income from the multistate activ-
ities of Gray & Dudley constitutes a justifiable basis for a grasping
Tennessee tax policy of taxing the entire net income from multistate
operation. The simple facts are that part of Gray & Dudley's income
is attributable to activity that takes place beyond the borders of
Tennessee. Under the construction of the Tennessee statute given
by the Ownbey case, Tennessee taxing authority is permitted to reap
where Tennessee clearly has not sown. This case affords an illustra-
tion of the need for uniform and equitable guide lines regulating
taxation of multistate business.
In addition, there is some question as to whether the commerce
clause, properly applied, would permit Tennessee to tax the entire
net income of Gray & Dudley. Even though Gray & Dudley may not
yet be paying taxes on their operations in other states, nevertheless,
it is fairly clear that some of the other states could tax that portion
of the income attributable to those states. As we have seen, it is
fairly certain that Public Law 86-272 does not immunize some of
Gray & Dudley's operations from an income tax by states other than
8. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 227 (2d ed. 1961).
9. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
10. 105 CoNe. REc. 16353 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
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Tennessee. Clearly, those states have sufficient nexus with Gray &
Dudley to impose a net income tax. Such a tax was sustained in the
Northwest-Stockham Valve" case where the connection of the tax-
payer with the taxing state was much slimmer than in the case at
hand. All that was done in the taxing state by the taxpayer in the
Northwest-Stockham case was the solicitation of orders by a foreign
seller through local sales offices; and the orders were accepted and
filled from an out-of-state source. Therefore, proceeding from the
position that states other than Tennessee have constitutional power
to tax a portion of Gray & Dudley's income, the question arises as to
whether this would not subject Gray & Dudley's income to the risk
of multiple tax burden not borne by local Tennessee business. When
such is the situation, there is authority to the effect that the tax is a
violation of the commerce clause.1
2
II. PRIVILEGE TAX As APPLIED TO FOREIGN CORPORATION-ORDERS
SOLiCrED IN STATE ACcEPTED IN FOREIGN STATE
The case of King Merritt & Company v. Worral'13 presents the
question of whether the commerce clause bars a Tennessee privilege
tax imposed upon a foreign corporation which uses commission sales-
men to solicit orders for securities, when the orders were sent to New
York where they were accepted. The securities were forwarded from
New York direct to the investor unless he requested that they be sent
through the local Tennessee office. Tennessee sought to impose a
tax for the privilege of soliciting or accepting orders for the sale of
securities.' 4
Taxpayer, a New York corporation, has its principal office in New
York City. It is engaged in business as a broker-dealer in securities.
Taxpayer's operation is a selling organization of commission sales-
men offering to the investing public shares in the various mutual
funds; and using their principal office as the key to their operations,
have established offices in many cities using one of their commission
salesmen as a local manager. This manager also obtains and trains
other commission salesmen to sell securities for taxpayer, receiving an
override on the sales made by these salesmen. The offices are leased
to and the rent paid by taxpayer. The telephone is listed in the
11. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
12. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) (tax on the entire gross
income of a domestic corporation ran afoul of the commerce clause); see Central
R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 612-14 (1962) (property tax applied to domestic
corporation subject to multiple burdens doctrine); Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 11 (Court indicates "multiple burdens" doctrine
is applicable to net income taxes).
13. 368 S.W.2d 745 (Tenn. 1963).
14. TENN. CODE AN. § 67-4203, Item 16(b) (1956).
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name of and charges paid by taxpayer. Necessary furniture and
secretarial help are supplied by taxpayer.
Over taxpayer's claim that the tax violated the commerce clause,
the Tennessee Supreme Court sustained the tax as applied to the
privilege of dealing in the securities sold through these local offices.
The court held that the taxpayer was engaged in taxable local busi-
ness in soliciting orders for the securities.
There are several cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court that cast doubt on the conclusion that taxpayer is engaged in
local business. Taxes, regardless of the amount, upon the privilege
of carrying on interstate commerce, have uniformly been held ob-
noxious to the commerce clause on the ground that the privilege is
given by the national government and not the state government. 15
A particular type of privilege tax frequently struck down as violative
of the commerce clause is an exaction imposed on the occupation
of selling goods shipped through interstate channels. One familiar
form the tax takes is a levy on the occupation of selling goods prior
to their interstate shipment into the purchaser's state. Many times
the Supreme Court has given short shrift to this sort of tax.
16
As the Tennessee court points out in the instant case, the pivotal
point is whether taxpayer is engaged in any local business, or are all
its activities in furtherance of interstate commerce. In holding the
taxpayer did engage in taxable local activity, the court relied on
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue.17 In that case, Illinois sought
to impose her privilege tax, measured by gross receipts, upon a foreign
manufacturing corporation which maintained a sales office and ware-
house in Chicago. Some orders for goods were sent by Illinois cus-
tomers directly by mail to the home office in Massachusetts. Other
orders were forwarded by the Illinois branch office. All orders were
accepted or rejected, and the orders filled by shipment from the
home office in Massachusetts either directly to the customers in
Illinois, or through the Illinois branch. Illinois tried to include within
the taxable gross receipts the proceeds from all sales made to Illinois
customers. The United States Supreme Court held that Illinois could
properly include receipts from all sales that utilized the branch office
(a) either in receiving the orders; or (b) in distributing the goods.
Illinois was not permitted to include the proceeds from the sales of
orders sent directly by the customer to the taxpayer's out-of-state
home office where the order was filled and the goods shipped directly
to the customer.
15. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v.
Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903).
16. E.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) (on solicitor).
17. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
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The Norton opinion is clear as to what transactions Illinois can
regard as taxable local activities, but the opinion is not clear as to
the exact reason why some of the transactions are taxable. The
Illinois branch office maintained a stock of goods; it received orders;
it held merchandise shipped in carload lots in order to save freight;
and it supplied services to customers by way of repairs to machines
and technical advice. The Illinois branch also made some over-the-
counter purely local sales to customers. It is clear, therefore, that
the Norton taxpayer had "localized" itself to a much greater extent
than the taxpayer in the case at hand.
The case of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor8 also casts
some doubt on whether King Merritt had sufficiently localized them-
selves so as to be subject to a Tennessee privilege tax. In Spector,
the Court struck down a Connecticut tax for the privilege of engaging
in business. There, the taxpayer was a foreign corporation engaged in
the interstate trucking business. Taxpayer, while doing an exclusively
interstate trucking business, had employees, office equipment, trucks
and two terminals in the taxing state where approximately one-third
to one-half of its business originated. The Supreme Court held that
the tax violated the commerce clause, since it was imposed on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
The latest authority on the commerce clause, Northwestern-Stock-
ham,'9 by citing Spector with approval, leaves no doubt that the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce is not a taxable local
privilege. Moreover, Northwestern-Stockham, by implication, seems
to make it clear that mere solicitation from offices within a state,
where the orders are sent out of state to be filled, is purely interstate
commerce. Hence, such solicitation, without more, as in King Merritt
& Company, clearly would not be a taxable privilege. If all of King
Merritt's Tennessee activities, including the maintenance of a local
sales office, are simply in furtherance of its interstate sales business,
under previous cases there is likely no taxable event that would
support the questioned privilege tax imposed upon the privilege of
solicitating orders.20
18. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
19. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
20. In two other cases an excise tax has been struck down, as applied to a foreign
corporation, which maintained a local office in the taxing state, with stock of samples
and a force of office and traveling salesmen, who obtained orders subject to approval
by the out-of-state home office, where the goods were shipped directly from the home
office to the customers. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203
(1925); Cheney Brothers v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918). Ozark Pipe Line
Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925), would seem to support the same conclusion.
There a franchise tax for the privilege of engaging in business fell before the com-
merce clause, although the taxpaying corporation maintained in the taxing state an
office, maintained and operated automobiles and communication lines, employed
1156 [VOL. 17
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It is entirely plausible to argue that the tax in the case at hand
should be sustained, although it is levied on interstate commerce, in
order that taxpayer will not escape its fair share of the tax burden.
However, the decided cases generally have not given much weight
to that argument when the Court thinks the tax is levied on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
21
III. APPLICABILITY OF TAX FOR PRIVILEGE OF DOING BusNEss
TO FOREIGN CORPORATION-SUFFICIENCY OF LocAL ACTIvITY
M. & M. Stamp Co. v. Harris22 presented the question whether
taxpayer, who engaged in a multistate trading stamp business, con-
ducted sufficient local activity in Tennessee so as to be liable for a
tax for the privilege of doing business. Taxpayer, a foreign corpora-
tion, sent agents into Tennessee to enter into agreements with local
merchants to use their trading stamps. For some months, taxpayer
maintained a redemption store in its own name in Clarksville, Tennes-
see. Thereafter, it entered into an agreement with a Clarksville
concern to redeem its stamps in exchange for premium merchandise.
Tennessee levies a tax upon each trading stamp company or agency
doing the business of selling, distributing, or giving away trading
stamps.23 Over taxpayer's objection that the tax violated the commerce
clause, the Supreme Court of Tennessee sustained the tax. The court
held that the taxpayer was engaged in local activity which afforded a
sufficient basis for the privilege tax.
The mere solicitation of orders for the trading stamps in Tennessee
would not be a taxable privilege, if the orders were approved and
filled by an out-of-state source, which sent the stamps directly to
the Tennessee merchant.24 However, when this foreign seller local-
ized itself in Tennessee by establishing facilities for redemption of
the stamps, Tennessee acquired sufficient nexus under the commerce
clause. Interstate commerce ended when the trading stamps were
delivered to the merchant. Goods that have been transported inter-
state, after the interstate movement ends, are no longer a subject of
interstate commerce, and dealing with them may be the basis of a
labor and purchased and installed supplies. In striking down the tax, the Court said
that all these activities were in furtherance of an exclusively interstate business.
21. For a discussion of this aspect of the matter elsewhere by the writer, see
Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46
VA. L. REv. 1050, 1091-97 (1960).
22. 368 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. 1963).
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4203, Item 106 (Supp. 1964).
24. Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Cheney Bros. v.
Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
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privilege tax.25 Thus, the activity of redemption of these trading
stamps seems clearly to be a taxable local event which took place
long after the interstate commerce had ended.
IV. USE TAx-ExcLTsIoN IF SUBjECT TO SALEs TAX
The applicability of a use tax to certain non-drug items purchased
by druggist-taxpayer was the question in MacFarland v. Morton
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.26 It was found that the taxpayer actually sold
these non-drug items to his customers, rather than making gifts of
them to the customers. In this situation, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that the use tax could not be applied as these items
would be subject to a sales tax when they were sold to the customers.
Taxpayer, a drug manufacturer and wholesaler, purchased from
suppliers quantities of non-drug items which it distributed among
physicians, clinic and hospital customers in conjunction with its sale
of pharmaceuticals. These customers had the choice of purchasing
pharmaceuticals from either of two price lists. One of these, desig-
nated the "Morton Pharmaceutical" list afforded the purchasers the
right to accumulate credits towards various "gifts" or "premiums."
The other list, known as the "Modem Medicine" price list, extended
to the purchasers no such rights. The prices of the same medicines
in the respective catalogs were very much larger in the pharma-
ceutical catalog than in the "Modem Medicine" catalog. The costs
of the non-pharmaceutical merchandise ("gifts" and "premiums")
to the taxpayer was reflected in the profit and loss statement as a
selling expense.
The Commissioner of Revenue took the position that the "gifts"
or "premiums" acquired by the taxpayer were tangible personal
property purchased for taxpayer's own use, and asserted against tax-
payer a use tax. Payment of 30,000 dollars was made under protest
and suit was instituted to recover that amount. There was a con-
troversy as to whether taxpayer actually charged for these non-drug
items. The chancellor found that since it had been shown that they
were charged for, and that a profit was made on them by taxpayer,
these non-drug items were sold for a consideration to the customer.
Since a sales tax had been paid on the gross amount of the charge,
the chancellor concluded that there was no use tax liability. The
25. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transp., Inc., 289 U.S. 249 (1933); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S.
249 (1933); Browning v. City of Waycross, 233 U.S. 16 (1914). Redeemable
coupons sent with goods by an out-of-state seller to a local merchant who made the
sales are not within commerce clause protection. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240
U.S. 342 (1916).
26. 368 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1963).
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supreme court adopted the findings of the chancellor and held that
a use tax could not be applied to the non-drug items, because it
thought this personal property was actually sold to the purchasers
and a profit made thereon by the taxpayer.
Based on the finding that the non-drug items were sold to the
customers who paid a sales tax thereon, and keeping in mind that
the use tax is normally designed to complement the sales tax by
taxing items not subject to the sales tax, the result in the case at
hand appears reasonable.
V. FtANcmsE TAX-LEAsED PROPERTY INCLUDED IN MEASURE
The case of Memphis Peabody Corp. v. MacFarland 7 had to
deal with a knotty problem in connection with the Tennessee fran-
chise tax. Tennessee provides that all domestic business corporations
shall pay annually a franchise tax for the privilege of engaging in
business. This tax is in addition to all other taxes,2 and is in the
amount of fifteen cents per one-hundred dollars of the issued and
outstanding stock, surplus and undivided profits of the corporation
as shown by its books and records. The statute further provides
that the measure of the tax shall in no case be less than the value
of the real and tangible personal property owned or used by the
corporation. 29
The complaining taxpayer used leased property in the conduct of
its business. The lessor corporation paid its franchise tax for the
period in question and included in the measure of the tax the real
property and improvements leased to the lessee-taxpayer. The tax-
payer had made improvements on its leasehold interest and such
improvements were carried on its books and records, and the values
thereof were used in determining its franchise tax liability. The
issue in the case was whether the taxpayer was required, in com-
puting its franchise tax, to include in the minimum measure the
assessed value of the leased property. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that, under the circumstances, the taxpayer need
not include the value of the leased property, because the court did
not consider it an asset of the taxpayer.
As this case demonstrates, the problem of what to do with leased
property in computing the measure of franchise and excise taxes
has been troublesome. In net income taxes and excise taxes based
on net income, apportionment formulas generally include, as one
factor, personal and real property. Troublesome questions arise
27. 211 Tenn. 384, 365 S.W.2d 40 (1963).
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2902 (Supp. 1964).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2909 (Supp. 1964).
1159
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
concerning the way in which a lessee-taxpayer should deal with
the leased property. Here is an area where some specific legislation
is helpful. Many states, Tennessee now among them, by statute in-
clude rented as well as owned property within the property factor in
a multi-factor apportionment formula. Some of the states having such
a formula provide for valuation of the rented property at eight times
the annual gross rent, with gross rent including all consideration paid
by the taxpayer for the use of the rented property.30 Inclusion of
property rented by the taxpayer in the property factor eliminates
otherwise arbitrary differences in taxes as between businesses that
own property and those that rent them. With the rapid spread of
leasing as a substitute for the purchase of buildings, machinery,
vehicles and equipment, as well as other property, a statutory pro-
vision governing leased property is of increasing importance.
VI. PRIVILEGE TAX ON PERSONS ENGAGED IN BUSINESS OF COLLECTING
ACCOUNTS-DEDUCTiBLrrY OF ATToRNEY's FEES FROM
GROSS COLLECTIONS
Dun & Bradstreet v. WorralP3 interprets the Tennessee privilege
tax imposed on persons engaged in the business of collecting ac-
counts. The statute provides that such persons shall pay a privilege
tax based on the gross collection of each collector.32 There were
two questions in the case at hand. First, did the gross collections
on which the tax was computed include collections made by attor-
neys hired by the taxpayer to do the collecting; and second, could
the attorney's fee be deducted from the gross collections for the
purpose of computing the amount of tax?
The complaining taxpayer had an arrangement with the creditors
for whom it collected whereby the creditor authorized taxpayer to
hire a licensed attorney to aid in the collections, if the creditor did
not designate an attorney. In nearly all cases taxpayer selected the
attorney. The taxpayer kept records of all the sums collected by
such attorneys, including all the fees charged by them; and when
an attorney remitted the amount collected, less the fee, to taxpayer,
it deducted its commission or fee and remitted the balance to the
creditor. The commission taxpayer charged the creditor for collect-
ing was based on the total amount collected by the taxpayer itself,
30. Elsewhere the writer has made a short analysis of this facet of the problem.
See Hartman, State Taxation of Income from a Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REV.
21, 67-68 (1959). Tennessee now includes rental property in the franchise tax,
using varying multiples for different property. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2909 (Supp.
1964). See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
31. 211 Tenn. 558, 363 S.W.2d 752 (1963).
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4201 to -4203, Item 28 (Supp. 1964).
[VOL. 171160
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
plus the amount collected by the attorneys, including the amount
retained by the attorney as a fee.
Under the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that for privilege tax purposes, gross collections
included not only collections made by attorneys, but also the sums
retained by the attorneys as fees.
The writer is unable to find any basis for disagreement with the
result reached by the court. Taxpayer seems to be trying to "have
his cake and eat it too." It had authority generally to hire the
attorneys, and its commission for collecting was based on the amount
collected by the attorneys, including the amount the attorneys re-
tained as fees for their services. Taxpayer claims these attorneys
as agents for the purpose of increasing the amount of the taxpayer's
compensation, but he disclaims the attorneys as agents when it
comes to determining the amount he should pay the state for the
privilege of making money through the use of these attorneys.
VII. AD VALOBEM TAx-APPLICABirrrY TO NoN-DOMiCiLIARY
INTERSTATE MOTOR CARREs
Three Tennessee cases quite properly held, it seems, that an ad
valorem property tax can be applied to non-domiciliary interstate
motor carriers operating in Tennessee, although the carriers did not
follow regular routes. The cases are E & L Transport Co. v. Elling-
ton,33 Jack Cole Co. v. Ellington,34 and Howard Sober, Inc. v.
Clement.3
The Jack Cole Co. and the E & L Transport Co. are foreign cor-
porations, and Howard Sober, Inc. may be a foreign corporation.
All three complaining taxpayers are irregular route motor carriers
whose trips are not scheduled as to time, route or number. These
taxpayers are engaged in interstate transportation business as well as
in Tennessee. Seemingly none of the taxpayers had any property
located in Tennessee. The taxes were assessed on the basis of the
proportion of miles traveled by each carrier in Tennessee to total miles
traveled in all states.36
Over both due process and commerce clause objections, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court and two courts of appeals sustained the
validity of the taxes as applied to these objecting taxpayers.
The Supreme Court of the United States seemingly has not
squarely decided that an ad valorem property tax can be applied by
a non-domiciliary state to non-scheduled interstate carriers, or to
33. 371 S.W.2d 456 (Tenn. 1963).
34. 372 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
35. 372 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-901 to -934 (1956).
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interstate carriers using irregular routes, as distinguished from inter-
state carriers using scheduled, regular routes. Nevertheless, the Court
has unequivocally declared that such is constitutionally permissible
under the commerce and due process clauses.31 On well established
principles, no reason appears why such interstate carriers should be
exempt, and the three Tennessee courts so held, pointing out that
these were ad valorem property taxes applied to interstate carriers,
and not a forbidden privilege tax on the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce.
Taxes imposed on interstate carriers for the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce are forbidden by the commerce clause.38 This
has not generally been true with respect to local property taxes
applied to vehicles of interstate commerce. Although vehicles are
employed to transport interstate commerce, that fact alone does not
afford either due process or commerce clause insulation from non-
discriminatory state and local property taxes. A property tax on the
vehicles of interstate commerce, such as barges, tank cars, pipe lines,
rolling stock, trucks, busses, and airplanes is a familiar type of sanc-
tioned tax. As to vehicles moving in interstate land transportation,
such as in the three cases at hand, it has long been settled that a
non-domiciliary state can levy a property tax on the basis of the
"fair average" number of vehicles permanently within the taxing
state during the tax year, although the individual vehicles traveling
into, through, and out of the state differ.39 Vehicles of interstate
transportation, if moving over fixed routes and regular schedules,
may thus acquire a tax situs in several states, providing the states
fairly apportion the taxes. The tax is open to attack on both due
process and commerce clause grounds where it is not fairly appor-
tioned to the use of the vehicles within the taxing state as compared
to their use without.
40
Where vehicles of interstate transportation consist of ships, for-
merly only a property tax levied by the state of domicile of the ships'
owner could reach ships unless they had a permanent port else-
where, even though the ships had regular ports of call in nondomi-
ciliary states.4' Now, however, water craft seem to be taxable by
the same standards as applied to vehicles used in land transportation
37. Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 615 (1962).
38. Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Western Lines, Inc., 297 U.S. 626 (1936); Helson &
Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
39. Nashville, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940) (apportion-
ment ratio of mileage within state to mileage without state); see Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U.S. 149 (1900).
40. Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933); Union Tank Line
Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).
41. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
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in interstate operations.42 Moreover, even a domiciliary state is for-
bidden, on due process grounds, to tax more than its just share of
watercraft, if the other states have acquired jurisdiction to tax the
vessel.43 Also, the same rules now seem to apply to property taxation
of airplanes as apply to vehicles of land and water transportation.
44
While it may be more difficult fairly to apportion a tax where
the interstate carrier does not have a regular, scheduled route, as in
the three cases at hand, nevertheless, such carriers should also pay
their fair share of the cost of the state and local governments whose
protection they receive and whose opportunities and benefits they
enjoy. Moreover, exemption of these carriers from the tax would give
them a competitive advantage over local carriers who must shoulder
the tax burden.
VIII. EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION FROM PROPERTY
TAXATION-APPLICABILrrY DuRnNG CONSTRUCTION OF
STRUCTURE To BE USED FOR NON-EXEMPT PURPOSE
Mid-State Baptist Hospital, Inc. v. City of Nashville45 presents
this question: Where property has been exempt for many years,
and the tax exempt institution (Mid-State Baptist Hospital) com-
mences construction of a structure on the property, with a portion
of the completed building to be used commercially, does the prop-
erty continue to be tax exempt until the building is completed and
put into actual use? The Supreme Court of Tennessee answered
this question in the affirmative, thereby giving the taxpayer an
exemption from a Nashville property tax until the building is put
into actual commercial use.
The Tennessee statute giving tax exemption to religious institu-
tions expressly exempts the real estate of a religious, charitable,
scientific or educational institution when occupied by such institu-
tion or its officers exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more
of the purposes for which the institution was created or exists. 46 The
statute has two further provisions that are pertinent here. First, it
provides that the property of such institution shall not be exempt
if the owner, or any stockholder, officer, member or employee of
42. Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949) (ratio of intra-
state ship milage to total interstate milage).
43. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
44. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944), as explained and limited, Standard
Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952). Elsewhere the writer has had a good bit
more to say about taxation of vehicles of interstate commerce. See HARTMAN, STATE
TAXAnON OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 79-95 (1953).
45. 211 Tenn. 599, 366 S.W.2d 769 (1963).
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502(2) (1956).
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such institution shall receive or may be lawfully entitled to receive
any pecuniary profit from the operations of that property in com-
petition with like property owned by others which is not exempt,
except reasonable compensation for services. In the second place,
the statute provides that the real property of any such institution
not so used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of
the specified exempt purposes, but leased or otherwise used for
other purposes, whether the income received therefrom be used for
one or more of such purposes or not, shall not be exempt.
Construing these provisions together, the court appears to have
reached a reasonable result in holding that the property remained
exempt until it actually was used commercially. That conclusion is
supported, in part, by the fact that that is the time when the prop-
erty is going to come into competition with other tax-paying
property.47
IX. IMMUNiTY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ROM SALES TAX-
TAXABILITY AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
The recurring problem of "governmental immunity" from state
taxation was the pivotal point in United States v. Boyd.48 Two ob-
jecting taxpayers, Union Carbide Corporation and the Ferguson
Company, objected to the payment of both sales and use taxes on
tangible personal property used by them pursuant to contracts with
the Atomic Energy Commission on the ground that they were agents
of the United States Government, and thus immune from the taxes.
Upon payment of the taxes under protest, each taxpayer, joined by
the United States Government, brought suit to recover the taxes.
Holding that taxpayers were purchasing agents for the United States
Government, the court struck down the sales tax as applied to sales
to the taxpayers. However, the court sustained the use tax as
applied to materials used by taxpayers on the ground that, in the
performance of their contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission,
the taxpayers were independent contractors.
Tennessee imposes a sales tax on the privilege of selling tangible
personal property at retail. "Sale" is defined as any transfer of title
or possession, or both, for a consideration, and includes the fabrica-
tion of tangible personal property for consumers. The Tennessee
statute imposes a use tax on the privilege of using property, irre-
spective of the title, ownership of the property, or of any tax immunity
47. In another connection the writer has discussed somewhat more in detail the
Tennessee exemption statute as applied to religious institutions. See Hartman, State
and Local Taxation-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VA". L. REv. 865 (1963).
48. 211 Tenn. 139, 363 S.W.2d 193 (1962). After this article was written, the
Boyd case was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. 84 Sup. Ct. 1518 (1964).
1164 [VOL. 17
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
which may be enjoyed by the owner of the property. The use tax.
statute expressly applies to contractors who use tangible personal
property in the performance of a contract, unless such property has
been previously subjected to a sales or use tax, and the tax due
thereon has been paid. The use tax is measured by the purchase
price or fair market value of the property, whichever is greater.
The State of Tennessee sought to apply its sales or use tax, which-
ever might be applicable, to materials sold and used by taxpayers
for the performance of certain experimental and production work
as part of a national research and development program whose ob-
jective is the production of atomic bombs. In most material respects
the Atomic Energy Commission's contracts with Carbide and Fer-
guson appear identical. Under the terms of their contract with the
Atomic Energy Commission, taxpayers' responsibilities are the man-
agement, operation and maintenance of plants engaged in nuclear
research and development. The contracts recite that taxpayers have
organizations of personnel with the initiative, ingenuity, and other
qualifications necessary for providing the desired services. The con-
tract further provides that, in the absence of instructions from the
Atomic Energy Commission, taxpayers will use their best judgment,
skill, and care in all matters pertaining to the performance of their
contracts. Taxpayers hired their own employees, however, the
Atomic Energy Commission could require dismissal of employees
deemed incompetent, or careless, or whose employment was thought
inimical with the public interest. Taxpayers' compensation was
based on a cost-plus-fixed-fee arrangement, which included all taxes
required to be paid by taxpayers. The taxpayers were charged with
the duty of procuring many materials, supplies, equipment and fa-
cilities necessary in the performance of their contracts. Payments
were made with funds advanced by the Atomic Energy Commission
by means of special bank accounts. Title to all property bought and
used by taxpayers passed directly from the vendor to the Commission.
The Tennessee Supreme Court was of the opinion that taxpayers
were purchasing agents for the Atomic Energy Commission, and as
such, were entitled to recover the sales taxes paid on purchases made
by them. Governmental immunity was held to preclude the im-
position of the sales tax under the authority of Kern-Limerick, Inc.
v. Scurlock.49 There the United States Supreme Court struck down
an Arkansas sales tax as applied to sales of tractors to private con-
tractors who, as purchasing agents of the United States Govern-
ment, purchased the tractors to build a naval ammunition depot.
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that, in the per-
49. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
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formance of their contracts, the taxpayers were independent con-
tractors, rather than agents of the Atomic Energy Commission. As
such, they were held liable for the use tax applied to the use of the
property by them, although the property was owned by the Atomic
Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission would have
been immune to a property tax.50 However, the privilege of tsing
this tax exempt property by taxpayers, as independent contractors,
is a constitutionally taxable privilege under recent authority.51
Policywise, it is most difficult for this writer to see any good reason
why the United States Government should be able by means of
contractual arrangement to drop its mantle of tax immunity on a
purely private contractor with a Government contract, so as to ward
off a completely non-discriminatory sales or use tax, irrespective of
whether the private contractor is called an agent of the Govern-
ment or an independent contractor. In virtually all the recent
cases involving governmental immunity, as in the Boyd case, the
Federal Government has agreed to pay the tax if the contractor
became liable. This means the Federal Government has not escaped
any tax if the contractor is liable. In any event, the contractor
is granted a competitive advantage over his taxpaying competitors
who are taxed to pay the cost of the state government, whose
benefits and protection the tax immune contractor enjoys. More-
over, how does the Federal Government have any reasonable basis
for fearing destruction, or even hampering, at the hands of the
state taxing power, as Marshall put it, in light of the fact that
the Federal Government has by contract voluntarily assumed the
questioned tax liability of the contractor.
X. ADI NISTRATIVE PEmEDs-EXIIAUSTION OF REMEDIES AS
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SEEKING JUDICIAL RELIEF
Elliott v. Equalization Board of Carter County52 is a repetition
of a familiar warning to taxpayers to exhaust their administrative
remedies before going to court. A Tennessee statute provides that
when the County Board of Equalization shall have determined the
matters of equalization and values before it and within its jurisdic-
tion, such action shall be final, except insofar as the same may be
reviewed or changed by the State Board of Equalization.
53
The complaining taxpayer (also tax assessor) did not follow this
remedy. After losing in the County Board, he brought suit in the
50. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
51. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958); United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
52. 372 S.W.2d 181 (Tenn. 1963).
53. TE~x. CODE ANN. § 67-809 (1956).
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chancery court to enjoin the County Board without first appealing
to the State Board of Equalization. Taxpayer alleged that the
County Equalization Board passed a resolution to the effect that all
property located within the county would be assessed at thirty-three
and one-third per cent of its actual value, and that such is in viola-
tion of the state law which requires that the property be assessed
at its actual cash value. Taxpayer also claimed that the County
Equalization Board was assessing the property on the basis of the
preceding year's assessment, in an attempt to equalize the property
values for the year in question. A demurrer to the taxpayer's bill
of complaint was sustained by the Tennessee Supreme Court and
the suit dismissed. The court held that the remedy available was
an appeal to the State Equalization Board, rather than a suit in the
courts. In short, the court held that taxpayer did not exhaust his
administrative remedy.
It is the general rule that a taxpayer seeking judicial relief from
an erroneous assessment must have exhausted his remedies before
the administrative body empowered initially to correct the error.5
However, the administrative remedies need not be exhausted before
the taxpayer seeks judicial relief if the taxes are illegal or void.
55
Article II, section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that
all property shall be assessed according to its value. This section of
the constitution is said to be mandatory.56 Has not the complaining
taxpayer come pretty near to alleging that the County Board's action
in the Elliott case is illegal, when he alleges that it was assessing the
property at only one-third of its value, in light of the fact that the
constitution provides that it shall be assessed at its true value?
A recent New Jersey case 57 would seem to say that such action by
the County Board of Equalization is illegal. New Jersey has a re-
quirement that property must be assessed at full value. A group of
taxpayers brought a proceeding against the township assessors seek-
ing a mandamus order directing them to assess all property at its
full value, according to the statutory requirement. In one of the
most momentous decisions in property tax law in modern times, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, writing a virtual treatise on the evils
54. Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 319, 217 P.2d 946, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950).
55. Bank v. Memphis, 107 Tenn. 66, 64 S.W. 13 (1901); Hale's Cut Rate Drug
Store v. State, 45 Tenn. App. 110, 321 S.W.2d 262 (M.S. 1958); see Stason, judicial
Review of Tax Errors-Effect of Failure To Resort to Administrative Remedies, 28
Mrcu. L. REv. 637, 646 (1930).
56. Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 160-61, 36 S.W. 1041
(1897).
57. Switz v. Township of Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957).
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of departing from the statutory mandate that properties be assessed
at full value, held that the mandamus order should issue.
There is one further point that needs to be considered in deter-
mining whether the complaining taxpayer had a right to seek judicial
relief without first appealing to the State Board of Equalization.
The Tennessee statute describing the jurisdiction of the State Board
of Equalization provides that a taxpayer shall have a right to a hear-
ing and determination by the State Board of Equalization of any
complaint he may make on the ground that property other than his
own has been assessed at less than the actual cash value thereof.58
Even though the tax in the case at hand is considered illegal, which
normally would give direct access to the courts without first pursuing
the administrative remedy, nevertheless, this right of appeal to the
State Board of Equalization might be construed to require an attempt
to obtain administrative relief before seeking judicial relief. The
case at hand apparently so construes the matter.
XI. FAmuRE To MAKE PROPER COLLECTIONS OF SALES AND
USE TAx-HONEST MISTAKE AS EXCUSE
The Tennessee Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Butler5 9
once again emphasizes that honest mistakes will not relieve a seller
from penalties for failure to make proper collections of sales and
use taxes. The court applied Swartz v. Atkins, 60 where it had held
that the legislature in making the five per cent penalty intended for
it to apply in any instance where the taxpayer had failed to make
his return and make the payments on time. This is rather sweeping
language, but the element of "wilful intent" in failing to pay a tax is
required by the statute only where the penalty is much larger than
five per cent.
61
The Tennessee Retailers' Sales Tax Act imposes privilege taxes in
the form of sales and use taxes on various types of transactions. 62
One of those taxable privileges is the business of selling tangible
personal property at retail. It is only a "retail sale" or "sale at retail"
that is taxable. Those taxable sales mean a sale to a consumer or
to any person for any purpose other than for resale. Under the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Revenue,
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-821 (1956).
59. 211 Tenn. 196, 364 S.W.2d 361 (1963).
60. 204 Tenn. 23, 315 S.W.2d 393 (1958).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3206 (1956). On two prior occasions the writer has
had occasion to comment on the penalty provisions of this statute. See Hartman,
State and Local Taxation-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. Rnv. 879 (1963); Hart-
man, State and Local Taxation-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1346 (1959).
62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3001 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-3001 to -3003
(Supp. 1964).
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it is provided that when a dealer (here complainant-General Elec-
tric) sells its property free of the sales or use tax on a certificate of
re-sale, when the dealer knows, or should know in the use of ordinary
care, that the property is not for re-sale by the purchaser, but is for
his use, then the dealer shall be liable for the tax.
63
General Electric sued to recover penalties paid under protest.
The contention of complainant was based upon the proposition that
it was guilty only of honest mistakes or a mistaken interpretation of
the law relating to the sales and use tax, consequently, it could
recover payment of penalties under the equitable power of the
court. As authority for its position, complainant relied upon Ten-
nessee Products and Chemical Corp. v. Dickinson.64 Essentially
repudiating the rationale of the Dickinson case, the court denied
recovery of the penalties and rejected complainant's position.
There were several different types of transactions involved in the
case at hand. The court affirmed the chancellor's denial of recovery
on two types of sales where the penalties arose as a result of an
honest mistake by complainant in calculating the amount of tax due.
The court then reversed the chancellor and denied recovery in other
types of transactions.
First, there were sales by complainant to the Standard Disin-
fectant Co. on which complainant failed to collect the sales and use
taxes. Standard was engaged in selling janitorial supplies and it
held a certificate which would exempt it from the sales tax where it
bought things for re-sale. Under the Tennessee taxing statute, these
sales to Standard for re-sale by Standard would not have been tax-
able. However, the items in question were purchased by Standard
to be used as gifts and premiums to Standard's customers. Since
these items were not for re-sale, but purely for the use and con-
sumption by Standard, they were subject to the sales tax. The
chancellor allowed recovery of the penalties. The supreme court
reversed. It concluded that when it appeared to complainant that
Standard was not in the business of reselling the items in question,
then it became the duty of complainant to collect the tax from
Standard. Since complainant did not make collections of the tax,
it became liable for the statutory penalty. The court concluded that
the burden was cast upon complainant to determine whether or not
the sales were taxable.
Under the rationale of this phase of the court's opinion, it is clear
that a seller has a very strict liability to determine whether items
sold are for re-sale and not taxable; or whether they are to be used
63. Tennessee Sales and Use Tax Reg., No. 68.
64. 195 Tenn. 63, 256 S.W.2d 709 (1953).
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or consumed by the purchaser and are, therefore, taxable sales.
A second type of sales transaction involved in the case at band
concerned sales made by complainant to the Borden Electric Com-
pany. Borden was both a dealer and a contractor, but in the in-
stances out of which the tax in question arose, the sales were of
certain products for the use on a construction project. The chan-
cellor had allowed complainant to recover. In reversing the chancellor,
the supreme court concluded that, since the complainant knew the
vendee (Borden) was both a dealer and a contractor, there was an
obligation on the complainant-vendor to determine whether or not
the articles in question were tax free. The court also expressed the
view that there was some indication from the record that com-
plainant had actual knowledge that these items in question were
being sold to Borden for use on the job and not for resale.
The third type of sales transactions involved in the General Elec-
tric case concerned sales to the Shannon Electric Co. Seemingly
these sales were wholly consummated within Tennessee by a Tennes-
see vendee (Shannon), although the items were to be shipped to Fort
Campbell, Kentucky. The goods in question were to be used in that
portion of Fort Campbell which lies within Tennessee.
The chancellor had allowed recovery of the penalty by Shannon
on the ground that the transaction was in interstate commerce. The
supreme court reversed, holding that even though the carrier did
cross the state line with the goods in question, nevertheless, that
did not make the transaction interstate commerce, since the goods
returned to Tennessee.
While agreeing with the result reached by the supreme court
regarding the sales to Shannon, there might well be some question
as to the correctness of the reasoning by which the court reached
that result. In holding that the shipment to Ft. Campbell, Kentucky
did not constitute interstate commerce, since the goods returned to
Tennessee, the court relied on Lehigh Valley R.R. v. PennsylvaniaeS
decided in 1892. That case supports the holding of the court. How-
ever, two subsequent cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court cast doubt on the validity of the Lehigh Valley holding.
Twenty-eight years after Lehigh, the Supreme Court decided West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight,G where a telegraph company
transmitted a message from one point to another in the same state
by sending the message into another state and back to the sending
state. While it would have been possible to send the message with-
out sending it into the second state, it was sent over the route
65. 145 U.S. 192 (1892).
66. 254 U.S. 17 (1920).
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ordinarily used, was quicker, more convenient, and more economical
for the company. Speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, the Court
declared that the "transmission of a message through two States is
interstate commerce as a matter of fact," and the "fact must be
tested by the actual transaction." "Moreover, the motive for sending
the message through the second State," declared the Court "would
not have made the business intrastate."67 When a tax on trans-
portation was contested in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,68 in
1948, the Supreme Court cited the Speight case with approval and
declared: "It is too late in the day to deny that transportation which
leaves a State and enters another State is 'Commerce ... among the
several States' simply because the points from and to are in the
same State."
However, the tax on the sales to Shannon can be sustained even
though the items sold were transported in interstate commerce. The
actual sale appears to have been consummated in Nashville by the
vendee (Shannon). If Shannon took delivery of the goods in Nash-
ville, and subsequently shipped the goods in interstate commerce,
the sale seemingly would remain a taxable local event under the
commerce clause,6 9 as the sale took place before interstate commerce
started. Of course, too, the consumption and use of the goods by
Shannon in the Tennessee portion of Ft. Campbell affords a consti-
tutional basis for a use tax even though the goods were shipped to
their destination in interstate commerce.7
0
XII. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Some rather significant changes were made in the taxing statutes
of Tennessee by the 1963 legislature. In the property tax field, the
legislature created certain personal property exemptions from county
and municipal ad valorem taxes. Thus, personal property in the
hands of the manufacturer, processor or assembler transported to
a plant, warehouse, or establishment within the state from outside
the state for storage, processing, assembling, or repacking and held
for eventual sale or other disposition, other than at retail, to a desti-
nation outside the state is not subject to ad valorem property taxa-
tion.71 This curb on county and municipal taxing power should
prove to be a stimulus for the warehousing business in Tennessee.
67. Id. at 18.
68. 334 U.S. 653, 655-56 (1948).
69. Utah Tax Comm'n v. Pacific Pipe Co., 372 U.S. 605 (1963); see International
Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944) (class D type
sales); Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
70. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502(10) (Supp. 1964).
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The legislative change creating perhaps the most interest and
certainly causing the most comment, lies in the field of the sales tax.
The sales tax was extended to include the furnishing of public
utilities (water, gas, electricity, fuel oil, coal and other energy fuels).
Sales to manufacturers are taxed at the rate of one per cent; sales
to purchasers other than manufacturers are subject to a tax at the
rate of three per cent.72 Also, the sales tax was extended to telephone
and telegraph service, repair services with respect to any kind of
tangible personal property as an incident to the sale thereof.
73
The 1963 Tennessee legislature also authorized counties and in-
corporated cities and towns to levy and collect sales and use taxes
subject to approval of voters of the county or city.74 The legislature
requires local governments levying the tax to give certain exemp-
tions. Thus, the sale, purchase, use, consumption or distribution of
electric power or energy, natural or artificial gas, or coal and fuel
oil are exempt from the tax. Also, the legislature placed a ceiling on
the rate and amount of the tax which cities, counties, and towns
can impose. The rate cannot exceed one-third of the rates levied by
the state. Moreover, any tax levied by cities, counties and towns
shall not exceed five dollars on the sale or use of any single article
of personal property.
In the field of the excise tax on corporate earnings, the rate was
increased from 3.75 per cent to four per cent of the net earnings. 75
The corporate franchise tax statute was also amended by the 1963
legislature. In determining the measure of the tax, rental property
is now included in taxpayer's tangible property. In cases where part
or all of the property is rented, the actual value of property will be
deemed to be the book value of all property. The value of rental
property is determined by multiplying the net annual rental by
certain multiples (real property multiple is five, machinery is three,
furniture is two, and mobile equipment is one).76
72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3003 (Supp. 1964).
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3002 (Supp. 1964).
74. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3050 (Supp. 1964.)
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2701 (Supp. 1964).
76. TEN CODE ANN. § 67-2909 (Supp. 1964).
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